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Proactive Disclosure
Review of the Afghanistan Program - Implementation Challenges, Lessons & Recommendations
Table of Contents
6.0 Implementation Challenges, Lessons & Recommendations
6.1 Program Strategy
The needs of Afghanistan have been evolving since the inauguration of the provisional government in 2001, and Canada's involvement and strategy have had to keep pace with this evolution. Prior to, and including 2001, CIDA's focus was on Stabilization and Security as the Agency provided emergency and humanitarian assistance to meet the challenges of returning refugees, disarmament and de-mining operations.
Beginning in 2002, this emphasis broadened to include investments supporting the process of democratic governance such as the constitution, presidential and legislative elections, and institutions at the national level and the planning of national development programs.
In 2005/06, the effort broadened further toward reconstruction and development to more sustainable development programs across Afghanistan, including an emphasis on Kandahar Province to complement the efforts of broader Canadian involvement through other departments (i.e. the whole-of-government approach). The Canadian effort expanded with the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, which seeks to provide a more secure environment under which development can take place in the province. The stabilization of Kandahar (and other southern provinces where other donors have PRTs) is critical to the success of Afghanistan's nation building. Yet this was not being realized, as the services provided through the GoA's national programs were not reaching the populations in these southern provinces on account of the complex interplay between insecurity, concerns of corruption and poppy cultivation in the southern parts of Afghanistan, which include Kandahar Province. Insufficient Afghan Security Forces could not provide the basic security needed for development.
In May 2006, there was a revision in the strategy. The new strategic framework, which is consistent with the Afghanistan Compact, includes the program in Kandahar and has a stronger emphasis on equality between women and men, and now includes the following 4 central components:
- Democratic Development and Effective Governance;
- Role of Women and Girls in Society;
- Sustainable Rural Livelihoods; and
- State Building and Stabilization, particularly in Kandahar.
The increased resources to the Program and inclusion of Kandahar add a different dynamic. Stabilization and reconstruction are different, but are connected and influence each other. With the combination of insecurity, the national programs not reaching the population, and the absence of capable local partners to design and implement initiatives, the risk of failure increases and development efforts become more of a trial and error experimentation of learning by doing. The inclusion of the PRT and the Canadian military increases the risk of casualties. The likelihood of non-concurrency on results expectations and measurement becomes a challenge, which will necessitate harmonization and agreement on the metrics for measuring success. There will be a great need and demand for achieving and demonstrating results. Clear and frequent communication messages will become critical.
Also, with the addition of the Kandahar component, the Afghanistan Program diversified from a largely "Program-based approach through Grants to multilateral organizations" toward a more complex mix of "program- and project-based approaches through a mix of Grants and Contributions to a variety of partners". This would require an increased level of effort from CIDA staff, and has implications for the staff resources devoted to the Program.
With regard to the Program strategy, the Review team identified the following lessons:
Lesson 1 (Flexibility in the Program Strategy)
In a rapidly evolving, unstable environment such as Afghanistan, it is important to maintain flexibility in the program strategy to be able to react quickly to unforeseen events and/or take advantage of emerging opportunities to address the recipient country's needs and achieve the stated objectives.
Lesson 2 (realistic expectations and risk tolerance)
In such an environment, it is not reasonable to expect that every initiative will succeed. It is also important to be realistic in the establishment of expected results, and have a level of risk tolerance that allows trial of new approaches to reach the long-term goal.
Lesson 3 (the importance of coordination and harmonization to manage the risks)
The Afghanistan experience highlights the importance for the Program to continue to coordinate and harmonize efforts with other Federal Departments (DFAIT, DND, RCMP and CSC) and other donors and multilateral partners in order to manage the very significant risks related to security, program operations and development results.
6.2 Choice of Initiatives and Partners (the National Program)
Initially there were very few NGOs established in Afghanistan, and many of those that did emerge had their roots in the large Afghan refugee communities in Pakistan. Few if any major Canadian NGOs had experience in Afghanistan. With some exceptions, CIDA declined to fund most of the unsolicited proposals.
Our interviews and analysis of the documents with regard to CIDA and donor community experience in Afghanistan revealed that the choice of Partners with a track record in states of crisis and insecure environments is crucial and recognized as a critical success factor. Some international organizations who lacked the in place infrastructure and experience to cope with the challenges of a hostile environment had to pull out.
For the most part, the Program made good choices of investments, initiatives and partners. They are in line with the Bonn, Berlin and Tokyo conferences and within the spirit of the Paris declaration i.e. working with the GoA by using the international multilateral delivery channel that has established infrastructures and experience in the field. Pooling most of the CIDA funds with other international partners to fund the GoA's National Programs through mechanisms such as the ARTF of the World Bank and UN organizations provides the needed predictability of funding for the GoA, helps to build the capacity of the GoA ministries and institutions, and optimizes the chances of achieving intended results while minimizing the accountability risks given the weak capacity of the GoA ministries.
Although not all of the 12 selected projects produced good development results, most did, including the largest through multilateral organizations as reported in section 4.1. In some cases, however, the timeliness and quality of reporting needed to be improved, as the development results were not always reported against established indicators. Our analysis revealed that in some cases: a) the Agency reporting requirements and needs were not sufficiently spelled out in the agreements signed; and/or b) non-compliance by Partners with the reporting clauses that already exist in these agreements was not flagged and followed-up with them for corrective measures and c) the analysis of these reports and follow-up actions were not systematically documented, probably on account of insufficient staff resources on the Program.
This highlights the importance of appropriate due diligence not only at the front end in the selection of the initiatives and partners, but also in the ongoing monitoring during delivery and implementation. This also highlights the importance of obtaining timely and pertinent information from implementing partners to make any necessary adjustments.
Lesson 4 (choice of experienced partners to minimize risks)
Working with multilateral partners, such as the WB and UN Organizations, which have infrastructure on the ground, the expertise and a proven track record to work in insecure environment, has proven to be a good way to optimize developmental results while minimizing the risks. However, even such experienced partners do not always succeed. It is therefore important to limit the extent to which organizations without experience in insecure environments are chosen as partners to implement initiatives.
Lesson 5 (selection criteria for partners and need to monitor progress closely)
With a flexible strategy, clear selection criteria up front for the choice of implementing partners is a critical success factor. Equally important is the need for the Program to monitor progress closely during implementation, even when well-known, experienced international partners such as Multilateral Organizations are involved.
Recommendation 1: (the need to strengthen monitoring and oversight)
- CIDA reporting requirements were noted in existing agreements with partners. In order to allow Program staff to effectively monitor the initiatives implemented by its partners, the Program should ensure that the Agency's reporting requirements, with regard to financial information and progress on development results, are more clearly reflected in the agreements with its partners, and respected. In the case of multi-donor arrangements, such as with the Multilateral Organizations, CIDA will need to work with the other donors to ensure this happens.
- In order to strengthen accountability for results and support knowledge building for future programming and decision making, monitoring activities performed by CIDA field and Headquarters (HQ) staff should be documented on a more systematic basis and include clear indications on progress, variance analysis of expenditures and development results on a cumulative basis, identification of issues, lessons learned and follow-up actions taken. The Program may also want to consider providing staff with appropriate training in this area as needed.
6.3 Level of Human Resources (HR)
According to our interviews and review of documentation, the Program had difficulties to staff field positions with candidates with previous posting experience or experience in countries in a state of crisis and to retain them. The level of living conditions (e.g. Bed & Breakfast type with limited privacy) for Canadian Based Staff (CBS) coupled with: the insecurity aspects; the stressful living conditions; the fact that the overseas premium allocations are the same as those Least Developed Countries (LDCs) with a significantly higher and safer standard of living; and the fact that Afghanistan is an un-accompanied posting are major obstacles for recruiting and retaining staff. These suggest that the incentive package for the CBS needs to be reviewed in conjunction with DFAIT, Treasury Board Secretariat, and other appropriate central agencies.
Considering the magnitude, complexity and challenges of the Afghanistan Program and also the corresponding level of effort required to plan, implement and monitor such a Program we reviewed the allocation of human resources at Head Quarters and in the field.
6.3.1 Improvements made in staffing
The Program made significant improvement in increasing the number of staff to manage the Program and allow staff to devote more time to their core duties related to the planning, implementing and monitoring of projects. Following a request from Program management for additional HR in April 2006, there was a significant increase in staff resources in the fall of 2006. For example, the number of HR has been increased at HQ to cope with duties related to communication with CIDA stakeholders. New project officers have been added at HQ. Some staff has been added for the common services at HQ and others have been assigned to the field in the PRT and Airfield in Kandahar. The following table provides a picture of the progression of HR allocated to the Afghanistan Program, as of the end of February 2007.
| Progression | 2004-05 | 2005-06 | 2006-07 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Core staff at HQ | 5.95 | 9.05 | 19.45 |
| Core staff in the field | 4.00 | 9.00 | 13.00 |
| Staff related to common services | 2.31 | 4.15 | 9.22 |
| Total staff | 12.26 | 22.20 | 41.67 |
In the fall 2006, there was the creation of the Results and Accountability Unit (RAU), with 4 persons, to support the RBM framework of the Program and improve its ability to report on development results.
6.3.2 Areas for further improvement
Even with the improvements mentioned above that were made, additional resources may be needed to cope with the actual demands and level of effort.
In the Field―Aid Section
Our interviews revealed the difficulty of Canadian Based Staff (CBS) in the field to cope with the level of effort required to prepare, assist and follow-up with regard to the numerous meetings with the Donors and Partners in the field, which are most of the time high profile experts and require technical abilities and experience. In addition, the number of staff is not sufficient to cope with the level of effort required for activities related to intelligence gathering, analysis, various pro-active and follow-up actions vis-à-vis such a complex and significant Program.
In the Field―Program Support Unit (PSU)
The Program also had difficulties with its Program Support Unit (PSU) in the field. The PSU did not perform nor provide the expected services in terms of administrative, logistical and Program support (e.g. data collection for base line information, intelligence gathering, etc.). In addition, the PSU was not fully operational after mid 2006, when the former PSU Director finished his contract. Several positions have since remained vacant. This Unit will need to be re-operationalized to provide the AID section and HQ staff with the needed services to more effectively and efficiently implement and monitor the Program.
At CIDA HQ―the Results and Accountability Unit
With regard to the newly created "Results and Accountability Unit" (RAU) located at HQ, we found that this unit was not fully staffed and operational as of the end of January 2007. This Unit will be a key element in supporting Program Management in the areas of RBM, reporting of development results and knowledge sharing of lessons learned for their integration in the Programming cycle.
At CIDA HQ―Common Support Services
Additional support in this area is required from specialists such as Financial Management Advisors (FMA) in order to ensure, for example, adequate monitoring of highly complex financial and operational reports received from multilateral organizations. The following sub-section deals with a benchmarking exercise with other Programs or states in crisis.
6.3.3 Benchmarking of Human Resources and other support services
In order to provide some indication about the adequacy of the actual level of HR and related support services dedicated to the Afghanistan Program, the Review Team performed a benchmarking exercise with other CIDA Programs dealing with states in crisis. Annex 3 provides an analysis of the human and other support services resources available and allocated to the Afghanistan, compared to Iraq and Haiti Programs. For example, if we compare Afghanistan with Iraq, the Program in Afghanistan was managing twice (1.9) more the amount of budget per resource available than Iraq in 2004-05. The situation was normalized in 2006-07 i.e. the ratio was reduced to almost the same (1.1 to 1.0). Another example was the fact the level of effort to manage Grant Agreements was 2.5 times more in Afghanistan than Iraq and 8.2 times more compared with Haiti. These ratios do not reflect the additional burden of communications and information demands on the Afghanistan Program
The Program strategy with regard to contracting is different in the Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti Programs. In Afghanistan, an international commitment was taken to work with international multilateral organizations and therefore use more grant agreements. That type of agreement requires a different profile of CIDA staff to manage that type of arrangement. In addition, the monitoring is at a higher level and requires more expertise. Therefore, the Program needs to work together with experts such as Financial Management Advisors (FMAs) in order to ensure that the financial and operational reporting is in line with CIDA requirements. In the case of Afghanistan, the FMA resource was very limited, with 0.1 person compared to 1 full time FMA for Iraq. This lack of resource coupled with the high demand of information to the Afghanistan Program staff from stakeholders had an impact on the ability of staff to devote time to the monitoring of their Project portfolios.
In light of the above findings, the Review Team offers the following lessons and recommendations:
Lesson 6 (Recruiting & retaining staff)
The need for a Program to have experienced staff, in terms of specific competencies and profile, is crucial especially in an environment, which is highly insecure, with high staff rotation, and where the living conditions are extremely stressful. The living conditions of CIDA field staff in Afghanistan, coupled with the fact that the overseas premium allocations are the same as those LDC countries with a significantly higher and safer standard of living, are major obstacles for recruiting and retaining staff. Therefore, an adequate incentive package is a critical success factor with regard to staffing field personnel in fragile states or states in crisis.
Recommendation 2: (improve results tracking and reporting)
The recently created "Results and Accountability Unit" (RAU) at HQ needs to be fully operationalized to ensure the enhancement of the Results-Based Management (RBM) framework of the Program to allow management to improve its reporting of development results and knowledge sharing. This Unit would analyse the data and the information outlined in monitoring, evaluation and audit reports in order to extract results at the different levels (i.e. output, outcome and impact), lessons learned and actions to be taken for their integration into the programming cycle.
Recommendation 3 (strengthen field operations)
CIDA should strengthen its operations in the field in the following three areas:
- Number of staff in the field
The Agency should give consideration to increasing the number of staff in Afghanistan in order to cope with the challenges and required level of effort needed to more effectively manage the Program (e.g. intelligence gathering, analysis, monitoring, various pro-active and follow-up actions and the numerous meetings with Donors representatives and GoA officials in the field). - Incentive package for Aid Section staff
CIDA should explore with DFAIT, TBS and other central agencies, as appropriate, options to enhance the field compensation package allowed by the Foreign Service Directives (FSD) in order to provide an enhanced incentive package (accommodation, overseas allowances, home leave, etc.), which better reflects the relative hardship level and security risks that staff face in countries of conflict/crisis such as Afghanistan. This would enable the Program to attract, hire and retain high quality experienced staff with the right profile. - Program Support Unit (PSU)
The PSU should be operationalized on a priority basis to provide the necessary assistance to the CIDA Program to implement its strategy in the most optimal manner. The roles and responsibilities of this unit (e.g. on site intelligence gathering, monitoring, sector analysis, data collection to establish base lines, logistical and administrative support, etc.) should be clearly defined.
