|Project No||Projects Title||Transfer Instrument||Funding Channel or Partner||Disbursements in C$ million|
|FY 2005/06||As of end Jan FY 2006/07||Total Disb.|
|Rural Livelihoods and Social Protection|
|A-32609/32002||National Area Based
|CA||R & D||1.75||0.52||0.72||0.28||1.52|
|A-32600||Refugee Return &
|A-32170||ADB Hari Rud River
|Security and Rule of Law|
|A-032168||UN Mine Action
National Dev. Budget
|A-32671||Ammunition Survey &
Armed Groups (DIAG)
|A-032995||A/P Mine & AMMO
|A-32169||Law & Order Trust
of Law, AF
|A-32531||Making Budgets Work||G||UNDP||3.00||1.20||0.00||1.80||3.00|
|A-32806||Support to the Estab.
|A-32165||Election Support -
|Common to all sectors managed by Asia Branch|
|A-31648||Program Support Unit -
|Other projects managed by various branches||12.19||3.63||16.89||32.71|
|Total disbursements by Fiscal Year||103.00||101.00||81.00||285.00|
|I- Level of effort related to budget to be managed per resource|
|a) Afghanistan compared to Iraq:
The Program in Afghanistan was managing twice (1.9) more budget per resource than Iraq in 2004-05. The situation was normalized in 2006-07 i.e. the ratio was reduced to almost the same 1.1 to 1.
|b) Afghanistan compared to Haiti:
The Program in Afghanistan was managing six times more (6.1) more budget per person than Haiti in 2004-05. The gap increased for a ratio of almost 9 to 1 in 2006-07.
|II- Level of effort related to the number of contribution
agreements to be managed per resource available
|a) Afghanistan compared to Iraq:
The level of effort in Iraq is higher than Afghanistan. It was almost the same in 2004-05 and become 10 times more in 2006-07.
|b) Afghanistan compared to Haiti:
The level of effort is the same for 2004-05 and 2005-06 and almost twice as much in Haiti in 2006-07, the reason being the profile of the Haiti Program, which has a lot of contribution agreements.
|III- Level of effort related to the number of grant agreements
to be managed per resource available
|a) Afghanistan compared to Iraq:
The level of effort with regard to the management of Grant agreement with international multilateral organizations are much higher in Afghanistan compared to Iraq 5 times more in 2004-05 and 2.4 times more in 2006-07.
|b) Afghanistan compared to Haiti:
The gap is even higher with the Haiti Program i.e. 10.6 times more grant agreement
to be managed per person in Afghanistan in FY 2004-05 and 8.2 times more in 2006-07.
Compliance with the Treasury Board Secretariat's Policy on Transfer PaymentsFor all Grants instruments, we have to ensure that:
Management controls exercised by the Program Desk/Mission
For all operational projects, we have to ensure that:A Project Approval Document was prepared and received proper contractual and financial signing authorities.
A grant arrangement was prepared and signed by the proper CIDA level of authority.Due diligence report was prepared before the release of funding and included sections on: Capacity of the implementing organization;
Donor codes are derived from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO 3166) list of country codes.
Last Updated: June 2004 source: AIMS UNDP
CIDA's management accepts the findings and recommendations of the Review, and is committed to addressing areas identified for improvement.
The Review covers a representative distribution of major program activities, accounting for a majority of program expenditures. We note that additional information was provided by the Review team on the balance of the program portfolio, and we support comprehensive coverage in future exercises.
We understand that difficult local security conditions worked against field visits for the Review team. We do note however that the Review made full use of available documentation from international reviews, including systematic monitoring and independently documented evaluations undertaken with international partners of major projects. We have also worked through such initiatives such as Making Budgets Work to strengthen the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan for accountable management and oversight of its development efforts.
Effective development involves risk, and conditions in Afghanistan—poor security, a weak institutional base, and the legacy of decades of oppression and poverty—will continue to pose unique challenges for some time to come. Set against this backdrop, the generally positive results of the Review are encouraging; although we acknowledge that deep-rooted problems remain. The Review provides a useful summary of accomplishments, and has underlined the importance of high performance programs that we have been supporting, such as the National Solidarity Program and the Microfinance Investment Support Facility.
Lessons identified in the review and the recommendations related to reporting requirements by multilateral organizations are likely applicable to country programs across the Agency, and we are committed to ensuring that lessons learned in Afghanistan are shared across all relevant programs, especially other fragile states.
We also appreciate the specific focus on Canadian partners working with CIDA on the Afghanistan Program. We believe there is much to gain from close working relationships and we are actively seeking ways to collaborate further with partners as their programming evolves.
The following table summarizes: a) the recommendations; b) commitments and action already taken or to be taken to address the recommendations; c) the responsibility centre; and d) the target completion date.
|Recommendations||Commitments / Actions||Responsibility Center||Target Completion Date|
|1.a) CIDA reporting requirements were noted in existing agreements with partners. In order to allow Program staff to effectively monitor the initiatives implemented by its partners, the Program should ensure that the Agency's reporting requirements, with regard to financial information and progress on development results, are more clearly reflected in the agreements with its partners, and respected. In the case of multi-donor arrangements, such as with the Multilateral Organizations, CIDA will need to work with other donors to ensure this happens.||1.a) Agreed. Reporting requirements in all CIDA agreements will be systematically crosschecked for completeness and consistency. As noted in the report, CIDA contracts, grants and contributions already reflect CIDA's reporting requirements, but we will request whatever additional information may be warranted, including in concert with other donors, to ensure full accountability and results reporting throughout the program portfolio. Follow-up action in this regard is already underway with specific priority attached to those examples highlighted in the report.||1.a) Afghanistan Task Force; Director of Operations||1.a) Effective immediately|
|1.b) In order to strengthen accountability for results and support knowledge building for future programming and decision making, monitoring activities performed by CIDA field and Headquarters (HQ) staff should be documented on a more systematic basis and include clear indications on progress, variance analysis of expenditures and development results on a cumulative basis, identification of issues, lessons learned and follow-up actions taken. The Program may also want to consider providing staff with appropriate training in this area as needed.||1.b) Agreed - Systematic documentation of the monitoring of progress, expenditures, development results, lessons learned and follow-up actions is a key component of the terms of reference of the new Results and Accountability Unit. An updated results architecture is currently under development. The Unit will produce periodic reports based on monitoring carried out by CIDA staff and other relevant multilateral organizations. For better documentation of staff monitoring activities including progress, and variance analysis, adding the crucial additional staff resources required by the Program in the field and at Headquarters will greatly assist in implementing this recommendation, as will ensuring appropriate additional training for staff as required. The Program will identify the training required and put the rest of the new complement of officers into place.||1.b) Afghanistan Task Force; Director General (for the required hiring), and Director of Operations (for training needs)||
1.b) First wave of new staff to be in place by June 2007, with final placements taking effect by Fall, 2007.
Related training needs to be identified by Fall, 2007, with a training plan designed and launched.
|2) The recently created "Results and Accountability Unit" (RAU) at HQ needs to be fully operationalized to ensure the enhancement of the Results-Based Management (RBM) framework of the Program to allow management to improve its reporting of development results and knowledge sharing. This Unit would analyse the data and the information outlined in monitoring, evaluation and audit reports in order to extract results at the different levels (i.e. output, outcome and impact), lessons learned and actions to be taken for their integration into the programming cycle.||2. Agreed. The Results and Accountability Unit was created in the Fall of 2006 as an innovative response to the special requirements of the Afghanistan program. It has done an excellent job of capturing/reporting results at the output/activities level. The Results and Accountability Unit currently has 3 staff and recruitment for another 3 staff is taking place and it is expected that the Unit will be fully staffed by July 2007. This will allow the Unit to advance efforts to the outcome and impact level and build a practical Results-based Monitoring framework for reporting results and capturing lessons learned.||2. Afghanistan Task Force; Director General (for hiring the Unit Manager hiring), and overseeing the RBM framework design in collaboration with the VP, Afghanistan Task Force.||2. Unit staffed by July 2007, with new RBM Framework by Fall 2007.|
|3.a) The Agency should give consideration to increasing the number of staff in Afghanistan in order to cope with the challenges and required level of effort needed to more effectively manage the Program (e.g. intelligence gathering, analysis, monitoring, various pro-active and follow-up actions and the numerous meetings with Donors representatives and GoA officials in the field).||
3.a) Agreed. The Program has been actively seeking to enhance its field presence both at the Mission in Kabul as well as in Kandahar. DFAIT and CIDA have also been working to address logistical and security constraints associated with a strengthened field presence, and to enhance overall field coherence. New and replacement staff members have been identified, with postings scheduled to take effect over the Summer of 2007.
In addition, three new local Afghan officers were just hired for the CIDA PRT work in Kandahar, including two women for local Afghan NGO outreach.
An additional CIDA officer will be added to the Strategic Advisory Team (SAT).
|3.a) Afghanistan Task Force; Director General for hiring, in collaboration with the VP, Afghanistan Task Force working with DFAIT towards the space solution.||
3.a) Kabul and Kandahar positions to be created and staffed by Fall 2007.
Additional SAT Officer by late Summer 2007.
|3.b) CIDA should explore with DFAIT, TBS and other central agencies, as appropriate, options to enhance the field compensation package allowed by the Foreign Service Directives (FSD) in order to provide an enhanced incentive package (accommodation, overseas allowances, home leave, etc.), which better reflects the relative hardship level and security risks that staff face in countries of conflict/crisis such as Afghanistan. This would enable the Program to attract, hire and retain high quality experienced staff with the right profile.||3.b) Agreed. Work has been underway for some time on an improved incentive package for civilians working in Kandahar and Kabul. This has included extensive input to a joint CIDA-DFAIT communication Treasury Board Secretariat in Spring 2006, which so far has resulted in enhanced Rest and Recuperation (R&R) provisions. The Program has also established overtime policies that reflect the massive number of hours worked by our field teams in this environment. CIDA will continue to work with DFAIT and central agencies to enhance this package further. CIDA is also increasing its number of field staff, which will build a more sustainable and manageable experience for overworked individuals in the field. In addition, CIDA will pursue additional measures within its control and authority, to provide incentives to attract field employees, such as stretch assignments upon an officer's return to Headquarters, and learning and professional development opportunities.||3.b) Afghanistan Task Force; Director General and VP||3.b) Complete new proposals to central agencies in Spring-Summer 2007|
|3.c) The Program Support Unit should be operationalized on a priority basis to provide the necessary assistance to the CIDA Program to implement its strategy in the most optimal manner. The roles and responsibilities of this unit (e.g. on site intelligence gathering, monitoring, sector analysis, data collection to establish base lines, logistical and administrative support, etc.) should be clearly defined.||3.b) Agreed. The management team launched efforts in Fall 2006 to strengthen the Unit and take it from logistical support to a more comprehensive Knowledge and Program value-added operation. A new Director (who speaks the local language) has been hired, and further enhancements, including a new, larger location just selected for the PSU, are underway. The security environment will be an important factor to consider as the Program determines what kind of operational support could be provided by the PSU and whether meeting the key operational challenges faced by the Program could be better met by sending more CIDA staff to Afghanistan.||3.b) Afghanistan Task Force; Director General (for overall vision), and Director of Operations and Head of Aid, for implementation||
3.b) New Director now hired.
Re-assessment of PSU contract by May 2007.
New PSU location by Spring, 2007
New plan for clearly defined PSU responsibilities by Fall, 2007.
New staff in key remaining PSU positions by Fall 2007.